“Girl Crush” K-pop Idols: A Conversation between Korean, Chinese, and US Aca-fans Part II
/This piece is a continuation of a conversation started in Part I.
Donna:
In addition to Mulvey’s writing, Kavka’s (2020) work on “fuck-me” and “fuck-you” celebrities can be a useful lens to the fan perceptions of Girl Crush K-pop artists. Your discussion of HyunA’s overtly sexual yet “‘I don’t give a fuck’ attitude” (p. 20) resonates with Kavka’s discussion of subversive (sexual) agency in some contemporary female celebrities:
“the inversion of fuck-me to fuck-you implies a reversal of (sexual) agency, in the sense that I am doing the fucking, while, on the other hand, the rhetorical force of the ‘fuck you’ serves as a statement of resistance and resilience, a rejection of the feminine fuckability standards that aims to foment a revolution against them.” (p. 19)
Although in HyunA’s case, it is arguable that her sexiness—although in a non-conventionally overt form—still conformed to traditional standards of female attractiveness and was supported by major media complex’s conventional production system.
HyunA - Red (2014) (Source: YouTube)
Other Girl Crush idols/artists can also be approached through this lens, too, particularly the transition from more “oppa”-focused girl idols to “me” or “unnie”-focused girl idols. However, the notion of “fuck-you” celebrity requires some adaptations around how desirability is performed by Girl Crush K-pop idols that we discussed so far: reclamation of agency may be present but overt “fuckability” or romantic desirability can be absent, hidden, or deferred (e.g., fourth generation girl groups) or appear in forms that are reasonably interpretable as conventionally conforming to the male gaze (e.g., HyunA). Some of the contextual factors for this would be that K-pop exists in a relatively sexually conservative culture than (Western) pop music spheres and that innocence and youthfulness tend to be considered as desirable traits (which coincides with the typical age range of idols). Therefore, de- or subtler sexualization, especially if accompanied with less direct criticisms on gender inequities, may indicate a more malleable self-positioning rather than a radical subversion from “fuck-me” to “fuck-you,” strategically open to interpretation: are these expressions of feminist subjectivity, or are they just being cute—i.e., acceptably subversive?
This involvement of interconnected conventional media production systems in the making of K-pop idols is perhaps what makes Girl Crush K-pop an exceptionally rich topic. K-pop idols tend to be produced and managed by companies with commercial motivations within the realm of popular music. Conformity to common values and desires of their target audience is expected. Without denying the artists’ own contributions to their idol persona, we must not discount the multi-actor, commercial, and common taste-aware (aka, “Top 100”) production process in the making of Girl Crush idols. This means that at least in the K-pop idol production model, we must be cautious of attributing the idols’ Girl Crush-ability solely to the artist’s unique genius or their fandoms’ subversiveness. Rather, it should be approached as a collaboratively constructed and managed symbolic status, not independent of existing dominant structures (see Banet-Weiser, 2018).
Then, if we are observing shifts, the questions become: What are the (different) ways that the idols can be read, as encoded? Has the target audience shifted, or has its range expanded, and if so, in what ways and why? Can the readings reasonably vary depending on the audience group or would the readings be relatively uniform? How do these readings and groups align with or object to dominant patterns of power? Has there been (or do the answers to the prior questions signal) any changes to common values? Here, I would like to remind us of two things: first, the history of Girl Crush artists in the history of K-pop (i.e., that it is not a “new” trend per se), and second, the contemporary co-existence of girls and women’s empowerment and persisting (or perhaps in some ways exacerbated) anti-feminism in Korea.
I argue that this context, i.e., the infusion of dominant desires, is what makes Girl Crush readings by fans, such as what Lenore described, more subversive. That is, it is not so much that the Girl Crush idols are produced to be read as feminist and urging related social activism (or at least not as overtly coded as so as it may be in more tolerant cultures) but rather that the fans are, although at times with some disagreements, interpreting them as so. It is the fans who both individually and collectively girl crush on the girl crush-able idols, making salient certain readings and associated values, discursively and materially expressed through their fan engagement—which in turn can impact media system’s commercial decision-making processes. So regarding fans, the questions I would like to ask are: What are their understanding of the society? What are their desires, and how are they being realized and expressed through so-called “Girl Crush” K-pop? What have been the personal (including in immediate environments and close relationships), collective, and societal consequences of these realizations and expressions? I am less interested in sleuthing the (hidden) symbolisms and intended (hidden) meanings (e.g., to borrow from Lenore’s reflections, whether Arashi intended to question gender construction). I am more interested in how fans partake in shaping the symbols and meanings (e.g., questioning, subverting, and in ways reproducing existing essentializing gender expectations through their engagement with Arashi).
Crush gains dynamism in its verb form. If the “Girl Crush” can be described as a movement in K-pop, the momentum can be traced in the interaction between girl-crushing fans and crushing gender structures.
Lenore:
I agree with your idea, that fans’ interpretation plays an important role in the process of value building in “Girl Crush”, their participation may empower extra meaning to the original production, and the content will change depending on different audience groups. For example, (G) I-DLE's new song “Wife” has aroused various reactions in China’s K-pop fandom: some think they are showing their compliant attitude towards the social norm, some others see it as an irony to the female stereotype. Some passersby of the K-pop fandom cannot understand what this song is mainly about when reading the lyrics, so fans’ assistance (interpreting video/pictures) is necessary if they hope to build the image of the group and connect them with the feminism. In this perspective, fans’ participation has become a huge driver of “Girl Crush” and even social progress.
(G)I-DLE) - 'Wife' (Source: YouTube)
If we focus on fans and their appeals, like what they want to get or express from “Girl Crush”, we may also notice that most K-pop fans will not see themselves as fan of only one group, which means, they are travelers of the K-pop universe. In this circumstance, they fall in love from one group to another, looking for relevant values from them, gathering together and forming a strength that is hard to ignore. In response to the travelling feature in K-pop fandom, the term “crush” could also have the interpretation from the time perspective: fans get crushes on those girl groups, but they won’t stick to one, they love them momentarily and keep changing the objects to show their value in the long run.
“Girl Crush” is a part of the Korean Wave (Hallyu), which has had great impacts all over the world, and has also exerted influence on Chinese popular culture and social culture since it entered our context 30 years ago (Sun & Liew, 2019). From a transnational perspective, maybe we can extend the theme into relevant topics like cultural differences and acceptance, political attitudes, etc. For example, feminism is seen as exotic and mainly influenced by Western ideology in China, but the “Girl Crush” from Hallyu undoubtedly provides cultural proximity to the Chinese audience, so what changes will it make to our social acceptance of the whole movement? The queerness shown in “Girl Crush”, which was always a gray area in the Chinese context, has been a visible culture in K-pop fandom, what are the factors and the impacts behind it? For a long time, the Chinese government has been trying to build an influential culture that could build up citizens’ confidence and influence the world. What are the differences between these two cultures, and what can we learn from the Hallyu? These are all valuable questions waiting to be solved.
I think I should give a more specific description of queerness in the “Girl Crush” group since it’s part of the meaning of the term. I talked about Moonbyul’s performance earlier, but didn’t fully elaborate:
Moon’s performance also points to the queerness in “Girl Crush” K-pop group, which makes the style so popular in China. In mainland China, the government’s attitude towards the queer community is always seen as ambiguous, they won’t block queer content on social media, and they treat the community with the attitude “No Asking, No Mentioned, No Responding”. To avoid unnecessary troubles, like some aggressive strangers suddenly coming and insulting you when they search the content, queer community tend to use various forms to express their identity, K-pop is one of the forms. Just like Lady Gaga and Jolin Tsai, “Girl Crush” K-pop groups are also important to the queer community. However, one thing that makes it different is that the K-pop group seldom stands out and supports the queer community in public. So, as Donna said, fans’ participation has empowered the K-pop production of various meanings, and in “Girl Crush” K-pop, it is not only about feminism, but also queer sexuality. In Shin’s (2018) article, she mentioned female fans crossplay as BTS and cover their performance, especially the soft masculinity shown by some male stars, and tomboy-style female stars—whether it is fan practice or the idol company’s strategy, they all show non-binary sexuality of K-pop and its fandom. In this case, maybe Hallyu with such great power, will change what it means to be queer in Asian culture and promote social progress with other strong cultural powers.
Henry:
This has been a great discussion and sheds a lot of insight onto the political impact of this important K-Pop movement. I was struck while I was in China how many of my young female students knew and cared passionately about these groups, how many had developed interpretations about what they were saying through their music videos especially, and why their messages were so vital as resources for them.
I had been struck while I was there about the performance of hyper-femininity I was seeing on the streets of Shanghai, how often the women I saw were dolled up in ways that I see much more rare in the United States these days. I also was struck by how much those women who opted out of that system of gender performance stood out in this context. Some women seemed to be making conscious choices not to wear make-up, to wear more gender-neutral clothing which would not be out of place on an American college campus. This choice seems to me almost an act of courage, and it was in this context that I first encountered {G]Id-le as my point of entry into the Girl Crush movement. Strikingly, because of their positioning in the media industry, the female performers themselves rarely made these same choices in their presentation, though a song like “Tom Boy” did seem to speak to their fans who were carrying their self-empowerment much further into this space.
For the most part, the men I spoke with young and old seemed oblivious to these debates about gender that were taking place amongst women. For the most part, they claimed not to know [G]id-le or “Tom Boy.” When I showed the video to one man in his early 40s, he described the group as dressing like dominatrix which suggests how threatening (or kinky) their gender performance felt to him. It was this gap between how they were being read by women and men in Chinese culture which first interested me. This is what reminded me of the debates we used to have when I was in graduate school about the Madonna videos as they were coming out, as she embraced a more empowered view of feminism, as she both attracted and critiqued the male gaze, as she made more and more direct expressions of queerness and support for gay rights. Today we can see her mainstreaming certain ideas that were bubbling up from more underground groups like La Tigre and appropriating voguing as a subcultural practice from the NYC queer scene.
I am reminded of what John Fiske wrote about the young Madonna fans at the time: "The teenage girl fan of Madonna who fantasizes her own empowerment can translate this fantasy into behavior, and can act in a more empowered way socially, thus winning more social territory for herself. When she meets others who share her fantasies and freedom there is the beginning of a sense of solidarity, of a shared resistance, that can support and encourage progressive action on the microsocial level." Retrospectively, we can see how Madonna helped pave the way for the Riot Grrls and how their street activism became third wave feminism. Could the Girl Crush movement have a similar impact in Korea and China?
References
Banet-Weiser, S. (2018). Empowered: Popular Feminism and Popular Misogyny. Duke University Press.
Fiske, J. (1989). Reading the popular. Routledge.
Kavka, M. (2020). Taking down the sacred: fuck-me vs. fuck-you celebrity. Celebrity studies, 11(1), 8-24. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392397.2020.1704369
Layoung, S. (2018). Queer Eye for K-Pop Fandom: Popular Culture, Cross-gender Performance, and Queer Desire in South Korean Cosplay of K-pop Stars. Korea Journal, 58(4), 87-113.
Mulvey, L. (1989). Visual and Other Pleasures. Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Sun, M., & Liew, K. K. (2019). Analog Hallyu: historicizing K-pop formations in China. Global media and China, 4(4), 419-436. https://doi.org/10.1177/2059436419881915
Biographies
Do Own (Donna) Kim is an Assistant Professor at the University of Illinois Chicago's Department of Communication. She studies everyday, playful digital cultures and mediated social interactions. Her work examines boundary-crossing new media practices, such as around video games, virtual influencers, and Korean digital feminism. She focuses on hybrid contexts, norms and categories, and the notion of being human/artificial. Her work can be found in journals such as New Media & Society, International Journal of Communication, Mass Communication and Society, Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, and Lateral: The Journal of Cultural Studies Association (forthcoming). Donna received her Ph.D. degree in Communication from the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism. She is a Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies fellow alumna. Website: doowndonnakim.com | Twitter: @DoownDonnaKim
Ying Wang (Lenore) is a second-year master’s student in Journalism and Communication at Shanghai University. As a participant in various popular cultures, she explores cosplay, games and online fiction. Her research focuses on participatory culture, especially gender and sexuality in fandom in China.
Henry Jenkins is the Provost Professor of Communication, Journalism, Cinematic Arts and Education at the University of Southern California. He arrived at USC in Fall 2009 after spending more than a decade as the Director of the MIT Comparative Media Studies Program and the Peter de Florez Professor of Humanities. He is the author and/or editor of twenty books on various aspects of media and popular culture, including Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture, Hop on Pop: The Politics and Pleasures of Popular Culture, From Barbie to Mortal Kombat: Gender and Computer Games, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, Spreadable Media: Creating Meaning and Value in a Networked Culture, and By Any Media Necessary: The New Youth Activism. His most recent books are Participatory Culture: Interviews (based on material originally published on this blog), Popular Culture and the Civic Imagination: Case Studies of Creative Social Change, and Comics and Stuff. He is currently writing a book on changes in children’s culture and media during the post-World War II era. He has written for Technology Review, Computer Games, Salon, and The Huffington Post.
